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Robert W. Gillespie
Introduction:
One of the most rapidly developing issues of our time is that of
population growth and its implications. Perhaps only the problem of
war and peace so links the common destiny of all nations. Nevertheless,
population growth has as yet to engage the professional attention of
more than a very small fraction of economists. Further, almost all
J. J. Spengler notes that only 1 to 1.5 per cent of articles ap-
pearing in the professional economic journals over the last 80 years
have dealt with population. "The Economist and the Population Question"
American Economic Review
.
56 : 1 (March 1566) p . 21
.
of the attention has been devoted to studying population control within
the context of economic development strategies—not as an issue per se .
It is the premise of this paper that the study of population
growth and policies for its control deserves far more effort than it
has received in the past. It should be recognized, however, that al-
though the issue is a global one the optimal solutions may very well
differ among countries according to their level of economic and polit-
ical development. In the developed countries their more advanced
political and economic systems offer a greater range of methods for
implementing population policy, especially methods which alter the
economic incentives and dis-lncentives affecting family size.

2The purpose of this paper is to analyze some of the economic approaches
which have been suggested for population control in developed countries.
As a basis for this analysis we start with the family-size decision
viewed within the framework of consximer theory. In Part I the evidence
that population control is needed in developed countries is briefly re-
viewed, as well as some of the suggestions for effecting such control
through economic incentives. In Part II consumer choice theory is used
to analyze these suggestions and to compare them from the point of view
of economic efficiency. Part III some of the practical and ethical
aspects of using economically efficient methods are explored. Finally,
in Part IV the argument is summarized and some broad conclusions drawn.
For illustrative purposes the U. S. will be used; however, the analysis
is applicable to developed countries generally.
PART I - The problem reviewed ;
Overpopulation is a credible threat in developed countries only
If the impact of existing policies plus other social changes (e.g.
liberalization of abortion laws) cannot be relied upon to reduce popu-
lation growth to zero in the near future in these countries. A
number of demographers and other social scientists have argued per-
suasively that zero population growth cannot reasonably be expected
to be achieved by these forces but will require some form of conscious
social intervention. Their arguments are usually developed as a
criticism of "family planning" policies when these policies are pre-

3sumes to constitute population control policies.
The principal thrust of family planning policies within the U. S.
is to provide parents with the maximum choice regarding their family
size. This policy is implemented through research on more effective
contraceptive methods and the fullest possible dissemination of knowl-
edge regarding these methods. It is clear that there currently exist
numerous effective methods of contraception and that the level of
knowledge and availability among parents in the U. S. is quite high,
only the very poorest being an exception. However, the existing evi-
dence on attitudes regarding ideal family size shows an average family
size of around three children, which is significantly above that compatible
2
with zero population growth. Further, the ideal family size is quite
_
_______
Judith Blake, "Are Babies Consumer Durables?" Population Studies,
22:1 (March 1968), pp. 5-25. This study amasses survey data on ideal
family size. The average is consistently close to 3.0.
uniform across all socio-economic levels. Consequently, even a 100%
"successful" national family planning policy will still result in a
growing population if stated ideal family sizes are achieved. This
indicates the potential need for additional policy measures to control
population.
Part II - Economic, Analysis
We now turn to an analysis of alternative methods which have been
proposed for the control of births. Three different proposals will be
analyzed: the approach of the Zero Population Growth activists,
the use of taxes levied on high order births, and finally Kenneth Boulding's

4proposal for the use of negotiable llcgnses..
As a framework for this analysis we will follow Becker and assume
that the demand for children can be analyzed within the framework of
3
consumer theory. We assume that each set of parents has jointly deter-
3
Gary Becker, "An Economic Analysis of Fertility" in National Bureau
of Economic Research Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Coun-
tries (Princeton, 1960), pp. 209-240. For an earlier use of economic
analysis to analyze methods for promoting population growth, see J. J.
Spengler, "Some Economic Aspects of the Subsidization by the State of
the Formation of 'Human Capital'," Kyklos 4 Fasc, 4(1950). pp. 316-343.
mined a consistent preference function for children. We further assvime
that children of a given quality have a known market cost-price per
child which the family must incur. This cost-price is composed of the
food, clothing, shelter, medical expenses, etc., which the family must
bear to "produce" a child of a given quality. For convenience we as-
sume that the cost-price is constant for a family, that is, there are
no economies or diseconomies of scale with respect to family size.
From these assumptions an aggregate "market" demand curve can be derived,
This is shown in Figure 1. This cost-price combined with market demand
suffices to determine the quantity of new children demanded during a
4
given period. We accept the arguments of demographers reviewed above
4
We use births and new children interchangeably.
that this quantity, Q^ , would produce a positive population growth.
In Figure 2, we analyze the effects of the three selected proposals
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on the welfare of families with different preference functions for chil-
dren. To keep the diagram as simple as possible we will assume that
every family has the same income. We consider three families with a
preference at the initial market price P^ for one, two, and three children
respectively.
Children are obviously not divisible into anything less than whole
units. Given this fact a set theoretic approach is most applicable. We
ignore this problem because our main conclusions would remain unchanged
by this more refined approach.
The method currently being used by activist ZPG groups involves
developing and applying social pressure in an effort to discourage
parents from having more than two children. This "bumper-sticker" ap-
proach to population control, if effective, would cause the parents
desiring three children in Figure 2 to restrict their family to only
two. This would reduce their level of welfare from U, to U, . The level
4 1
It should be noted that the ZPG activities could also be interpreted
as educational rather than coercive, that is, as an effort to persuade
parents to voluntarily change their preference for children. This
approach would still leave unsolved how the "fractional children" were
to be allocated.
of welfare of parents desiring two or fewer children would be unaffected
by this method of population control. Such a crude method as this, if
effective, would not produce true zero population growth. If no family
has more than two children and not all families have that many, nega-
tive population growth will result. If the correct average family size

is around 2.2 as Boulding suggests, some but not all faatltes could have
more than two children without producing positive pop\ilatlon growth.
This crude approach completely ignores the problem of selecting those
families that could have more than two children—-that is, of allocating
the fractional children.
A second method and one which would no doubt quickly come to the
minds of U. S. legislators is the use of that all purpose tool of social
policy—the Federal personal income tax. The most direct and simplest
way to apply tax policy to population control would be to allow depen-
dent deductions for only two children; parents would receive no deduc-
tions for higher order children. Such a policy would only affect
A variant of this is to tax higher order births explicitly rather
than implicitly. (See Spengler, op. cit
. , p. 21). Prom the point of
view of our cinalysis these are equivalent policies, the major similarity
being that tax charges or deductions on specific births cannot be ex-
changed between families. The distributional effects of these two
would be different. Families too poor to be taxable would not be "taxed"
by the implicit method but only the explicit tax.
families with preferences for three or more children. The effect would
be to increase the cost-price of third and higher order births in the
family. In Figure 2 this is illustrated by P-, the complete price line
being ABG with a kink a B. Like the policy of ostracism, it reduces
the welfare only of families desiring three or more children. For our
illustrative three-child family in Figure 2 we see this loss as a move
from level U, to level U„. Nevertheless, this policy is superior to

the policy of ostracism, level U^ , because it permits parents, if they
wish, to have large families by giving up other consumer goods to pay
g
the tax on higher order births.
g
We have ignored how the additional tax revenue is used. It could of
course be redistributed through a proportional decrease in basic tax
rates. A redistribution would shift line ABE upwards in Figure 2.
The final policy to be analyzed is the negotiable licensing scheme
of Boulding. He has proposed that each person upon reaching maturity
receive a license for the number of births just consistent with zero
9
population growth (ZPG) . Boulding suggests that a license for 1.1
9
Kenneth Boulding, The Meaning of the 20th Century (New York: Harper,
Row and Co., 1964) p. 135. Also discussed at greater length in his
Economics as a Science (Kew York: McGraw-Hill, 1970)^ pp. 38-39.
births is the appropriate number within the U. S. For convenience we
Boulding does not present any supporting analysis for his use of 2.2
average completed family size to achieve a stable population. For al-
ternative estimates which do give a supporting analysis see Warren S. •
Thompson and David T. Lewis, Population Problems (5th ed.)
,
(New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 270-271jOr Ansley J. Coale^ "Man and His Environ-
ment," Science , October 9, 1970, p. 135, Coale's estimate is 2.25 and
Thompson's estimate is 2.38.
choose to use 1.0. The nuniber of nesa licenses issued during the period
are shown as Q„„„; this fixed quantity becomes the effective supply
curve in the market. The cost-price of a child then is raised to P-.

Our analysis abstracts from speculation in licenses. In practice, a
speculative excess supply function would probably exist and should be
added to the supply of new licenses. Further, if this scheme were adop-
ted, I would anticipate the creation of a forward market in licenses.
These complications are beyond the scope of this paper; however, the
existing theory of the forward markets seems directly applicable if
this analysis were to be so extended. Further, forward markets would
produce additional social benefits in the form of more efficient inter-
temporaral exchange. Only the licensing scheme would permit forward
transactions.
This represents the cost of inputs purchased by the family plus the
market value of the license, (?„ - P,)
•
This alters the choice situation by rotating the price line
around point B, the original choice point of the two-child family.
Each set of prospective parents has its money Income raised by AF, the
market value of their two licenses and they now face a higher price for
children,P„. The new price line P^ starting at F must also go through
B because families who actually opt for 2 children must give up this
12
additional income when they turn over their license to the government.
12
The new price line goes through B in this example because we have
assumed that licenses are issued on the basis of one license (child) to
each person reaching maturity. If, say, 1.1 licenses were issued, the
new price line would pass above point B.
Consequently, for families making this choice, the amount of income left
for all other goods Is DB either with the licensing scheme or with the
no policy situation, cost-price P„. This scheme, unlike the ones dis-
cussed above, affects the choice of parents with original choices of
two or less children as well as those with original choices of more
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than two children. Those families who originally would have chosen
zero or one child experience simultaneously an increase in money Income
and the increase in the price of children. This total effect could, of
course, cause families who had planned to be childless to now have one
child because the additional money Income of the one unused license more
than compensated for the increased price of the single child. Families
who had originally planned to have one child would not be induced to
increase their family size beyond one child becaiose to do so would leave
them with no net increase in money income but yet paying a higher price
for their children. Some of the original one-child families might, how-
ever, reduce their family size if the price substitution effect of thfe
higher price more than offset the effect of the Increase in money in-
come. Families who had originally planned to have two children would
have no net change in money or real income if they persisted in this
choice. However, both the price substitution effects and the option
of exchanging a planned child for the money income of the license may
cause some of these families to reduce their planned family size to
only one or possibly zero children. Families originally planning fami-
lies of three or more children will experience a net reduction in real
income with the Increase in the cost-price of children. Both the price
substitution effect and the income effect will Induce a reevaluatlon
of their family size plans towards a smaller number of children.
We assume that the tax on higher order children P_ is just sufficient
to produce a zero population growth. Further we have drawn it in Figure 2

11
so that It produces a higher effective price for higher order children
than the price, P„, for these higher order children. Whether this In
fact represents the correct relationship between these two approaches
when each produces a zero population growth is an empirical question.
The determining issue Is whether the licensing scheme produces a net
Increase or decrease in the demand for new "children by the families
originally selecting zero, one, or two children. The above reasoning
shows that the introduction of the licensing scheme could only Induce
an Increase in family size of the originally childless families and
then an Increase of only from zero to one child. For the families
originally choosing one or two children the licensing scheme could only
either leave their choice unchanged or reduce It. We assume that there
would be a sufficient reduction in demand of these families to more
than offset any Increase in demand by the original childless families;
hence, P, is drawn higher than P„.
With the above assumption Figure 2 shows that the licensing
scheme provides a superior policy to the scheme for taxing higher order
children or to ZPG bumper-sticker policy. It Is superior In the sense
that all families are either better off or at least no worse off under
the licensing scheme than under either of the other two. This result
comes about because the utility level of families with preferences for
large families Is reduced less under the licensing scheme. Some reduc-
tion in their utility must occur under any of the schemes if a stable

12
population is to be achieved. The licensing scheme permits the rights
to children to be exchanged for all rights to all other types of consumer
goods (money income) between families with relatively strong preferences
for children and those with relatively strong preferences for all other
consumer goods. Both of the other policies preclude any such exchange.
Even if we drop our assumption that P„ is higher than P„ the theory
of optimal exchange would still show the licensing scheme to be superior.
This is illustrated in Figure 3. The excise tax on high order children
produces a higher effective price for children for those families with
a strong preference for children than the price faced by the families
with preferences for small families. This differentiation in cost-prices
for children relative to the prices of all other goods would produce an
equilibrium point such as point A in the box diagram of Figure 3. The
dimensions of the box represent the total equilibrium quantities of
children and all other goods that would have been chosen under the tax
scheme. At point A both sets of parents have equated their marginal
rates of substitution to the effective relative prices they each face.
The slope of the tangents to U and U^ at A reflect the price of chil-
dren relative to all other goods. Both families could improve their
welfare if they were permitted to exchange goods for the tax benefits
of small families and thus move to some point such as B which is on the
efficiency locxos G-E. This they cannot do, of course, since children
cannot be exchanged.

13
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Of the three methods for the social control of population which we
have considered the licensing scheme is clearly superior. Our method
of analysis may be objected to, however, as being too abstract; that is,
it omits other considerations which are quite important if one is to
draw policy conclusions from this analysis. For example, what is to be
done if parents produce a child without a license in defiance of the
law? It is to considerations such as these that we now turn.
PARI III - Problems of Implementation ;
Although we have established the superiority of the licensing scheme
from the point of view of exchange efficiency, this analysis was car-
ried out at a high level of abstraction. In this section we consider
some of the objections that might be raised if one abandons the comfort
of this high level of abstraction. In particular we shall consider prob-
mens of enforcement and of distributional equity.
Penalties for Non-compliance
Boulding has suggested that the penalty for non-compliance be in-
13
voluntary sterilization. So long, however, as sterilization is an Irre-
^^ Boulding, op. cit . (1970), p. 39.
veralble procedure (as at present), this penalty seems harsh indeed. A
socially more acceptable penalty would be to fine the offender the mar-
ket value of a license plus some "court costs." The government could
then use the proceeds of the fine to retire a license through an open

15
naxket purchase. A problem with this approach arises, however, when
the offending parent does not have the financial means to pay the fine,
or if the individual's income is so low that forced payment in effect
punishes both the offender and the innocent child. Indirectly punishing
an innocent child offends the social consciousness and, of course, is
contradictory to the many social policies which are designed to insure
some minimum standard of care for children. Given this problem of
being unable to penalize the real income of a parent without simultan-
eously penalizing the child, involuntary sterilization may have to be
used for chronic offenders who are unable to pay the fine.
Distributional Equity
It is well known that observed family size is inversely related
to income; whether one can conclude from this observation that chil-
lAdren are inferior goods in economic terms is a much debated question.
14 See for example Bls^e, op. cit .
But if we do assume that children are inferior goods aind that the per-
cent of income expended on the support of children is also inversely
related to income then any tax on these expenditures would be regres-
sive. By this reasoning the licensing scheme could be considered a
hidden form of regressive taxation if the poor do indeed have on the
average higher preferences for larger families than do the rich.
The assumptions leading to this conclusion bear a more careful

16
examination. First, the empirical relation that is observed between
income and family size may reflect a differential knowledge of/or ac-
cess to contraceptive methods. That is, many more of the births in
low income families may be unwanted births than births to high income
families. A recent analysis of a 1965 sample survey of the number and
distribution of unwanted births found that at the time of the inter-
views, 32% of all births of respondents who were classified as "poor
and near-poor" were unwanted, while only 15% of all births of respon-
dents who were classified as "non-poor" were unwanted. This result
15
Larry Bumpass and Charles F. Westoff , "The 'Perfect Contraceptive'
•
Population," Science , Vol. 169 (18 Sept. 1970), pp. 1177-1182, Table 4.
calls into serious doubt the assumption that children are in any meaning-
ful sense (i.e. the result of conscious voluntary choice) a consumption
good predominantly of the poor. A more direct approach to family size
preference is to ask individuals directly what they feel is the ideal
family size. As noted earlier survey data on answers to this question
shows very little variability of ideal family size across income classes. '^
16
Blake, op. cit .. Table 2, p. 12.
On the basis of this empirical evidence we conclude that any form
of tax uniformly applied on all births would not be regressive, if de-
sired levels of family size were attained. Hence concern over the regres-
sivity of this licensing scheme is misplaced. Of course to the extent

17
that desired family sizes are not being attained, this raises an impor-
tant prior issue in its own right— the issue of family planning serviceF
for all. There is a recognition of this issue by Congress in the form
17
of a program to bring family planning service to all individuals. How-
Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-57-}
ever, even if this program is completely successful and we attain the
"Perfect Contraceptive Population" this population may very well still
be a growing population; hence some direct approach to the social con-
trol of population, such as the licensing scheme, will be needed if
18
population growth is to be controlled.
18
Bumpass and Westoff estimate in their study that if women who were near
the end of their child bearing in 1955 (ages 35-44) had been able to avo.-l '
all unwanted births their average fertility would have been 2.5 children
A replacement population in the U. S. implies an average fertility of
around 2.25 (Cf. note 10 above).
Let us now consider the regressive or non-regressive nature of the
alternative policy of removing the personal income tax deduction from
third and higher order births once the family planning problem has be;:..
solved, i.e., when all unwanted births are eliminated for all income
classes. The empirical evidence we have reviewed generally indicates
that average family size will be approximately uniform over all income
classes if desired family sizes are attained.
Assuming this is to be the case then loss of the income tax deduc-

18
tion for the third or higher child would be clearly regressive for two
reasons: first, the progressivity of marginal tax rates and, second,
the fact that the poorest in the population do not have any taxable in-
come.
PART IV - Summary and Concluding Observations ;
For any policy that limits in any way desired family size, the
most important ethical issue to be faced is in what sense, if any, natu-
ral children are an inalienable right and if so how a policy of population
control relates to this right. In this respect the licensing scheme
and the limited tax deduction are substantially different.
The licensing proposal implicitly assumes that procreation is an
Inherent right in two senses. First, it is a right not contingent upon
any prior economic or social status up to the point that an individual's
procreation equals one's own replacement. This is assured by giving
a license free to each individual at his majority. Procreation beyond
replacement does however require an economic quid pro quo and is thus
not assumed to be an inherent right. Second, procreation is a negotiable
property right— the right may be transferred in the market. This is
ethically just- if excess population produces social costs because in-
dividuals who voluntarily contribute to reducing these social costs
through small families should be rewarded.
By contrast, the tax deduction for replacement children is a right
whose value is contingent upon having taxable income. The state im-

19
plicitly rewards the rich more than the poor. Secondly, Individuals
who voluntarily contribute to ameliorating the costs of excess popula-
tion through having' a family of sub-replacement size receive no compen-
sation from the state for this act.
One final issue related to fertility and low income is the possible
effect of the licensing scheme on the "perceived" price of children.
One feature of the purchase of consumer durables is the relative unim-
portance attached to the rate of interest on the finance charges compared
to the size of the down payment. Purchase decisions appear to be much
more sensitive to the latter than to the former. If one then accepts
the analogy of Becker that fertility can be appropriately analyzed using
the theory of consumer durables, then this very high time preference
may make the licensing scheme particularly effective. This is because
at present the size of the "down payment" associated with a birth is
quite low compared to the total cost of raising the child to the age
when he becomes economically self sufficient. The adoption of the li-
censing scheme will operate to change this time pattern of costs by
providing an explicit and measurable down payment. The schemes which
reduce the tax deductions accorded children would be less effect-
ti-\Te if consiimers apply high rates of time preferences to the reduction
in their future income streams.
SUM!4MY
It is the premise of the paper that the social control of population
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is a real issue for both the developed and less developed nations. For
the former nations the policy options are greater because of their more
highly developed economic systems. This permits a greater variety of
ways in which economic incentives affecting family size may be altered.
In the U. S., policy discussions reflect this by frequent references to
the use of tax policies as a means for the social control of population.
We have argued that tax policies which do not bear uniformly on each
birth within a family are economically Inefficient in that they restrict
the achievement of optimal exchange between families. Tax penalties or
deductions cannot be exchanged. "'^ The alternative of issuing negotiable
19
An economic rationale for taxing higher order births could be estab-
lished if the social costs of high order children exceeded their private
costs. Arguments by ZPG groups that children from small families arebetter adjusted socially, more intelligent, etc. could be interpreted
to support a divergence of social and private costs for high order chil-dren. One example of such claims is: E. James Lieberman "The Case forSmall families" New York Times Ma^a^inf, March 8, 1970, pp. 86-89.
In this paper we implicitly ignore these distribution issues and focus
only on the social control of total population size.
licenses to each individual at majority provides a system of contol
which produces optimal exchange efficiency.
Although negotiable licenses will strike most people as an absurd
scheme, this largely reflects the failure of the economics profession
to communicate effectively the results of their science to policy makers
and to the public generally. Further the greater familiarity of the
tax system often leads to its use to achieve goals which could more
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appropriately be achieved by other methods. The long existence of man-
datory registration of all males under the Selective System demonstrates
that society can communicate effectively with individuals at the time
they achieve their majority. This plus our well-developed system of re-
porting births indicates that the licensing scheme is administratively
feasible. The private economy xjould quickly produce a market for the
exchange of these property rights as the economy has done for such other
rights as stock certificates or real estate.







